기사를 읽어보니 한국어 수능 지문 및 문제들을 영역하기 위해 챗 GPT를 돌렸던데, GPT가 아예 잘못된 엉뚱한 번역을 내놓았더군요. 댓글에다 지문을 영어로 번역해서 올렸는데, 댓글이 아직 검토중이라 그런지 아직도 안 올라가네요. 여기 올빼미에도 올려봅니다. (번역 관련 제안 환영합니다)
지문 번역:
[14~17] Read the following passage and answer the questions.
In philosophy “person” refers to a human as a specific individual, and “I” refers to myself among such individuals. The identity of a person is the foundation of all thought. I believe that the present I should keep the promise I made in the past because the past I and the present I are one self-identical person. The predominant view before Kant, which explains the identity of the person, is that the soul, “the thinking I”, persists through the passage of time as the single subject. “Subject” refers to the subject of cognition, whilst “cognition” means “knowledge”.
Kant, however, claims that “I think”, namely “self-consciousness”, is merely one of the conditions of possibility for cognition. These conditions do not warrant that something is real. Self-consciousness, therefore, does not guarantee that the soul is real, but merely opens the possibility that it is real.
Based on this argument Kant refutes the view that the soul is the person. Although Kant recognises that “it is the person who is conscious of its own identity in the passage of time” and that “the soul is self-conscious”, Kant notes that it does not follow from these premises that “the soul is the person”. For, whilst “consciousness” in the first premise means the consciousness of something that really exists, “consciousness” in the second premise does not mean that something is necessarily real.
Instead of directly proving the existence of the self-identical person, Kant proposes that the following assumption necessarily precedes our thought: “multiple subjects encountered in the passage of time are cognised as the self-identical person”, because only then would thoughts such as empirical or ethical judgments be possible. Construction of thought, which follows the passage of time, necessarily requires a diachronically self-identical person.
Strawson, whilst concurring with Kant’s view that the way of cognising the I differs from that of empirical cognition, criticises Kant by claiming that it is a mere philosophical imagination to assume that multiple subjects are cognised as the self-identical person. Unlike Kant, who neglected the body in the problem of person, Strawson considers a person as a compound of consciousness and body. It is a scientific fact, according to Strawson, that objects are experienced through the mediation of our body in the spatiotemporal world, and the cognition of the I is abstracted from empirical cognitions. For this reason, Strawson contends, experience in the spatiotemporal world supports the diachronic identity of the person. Since self-consciousness likewise relies on experience, Kant is wrong in claiming that self-consciousness is a condition of possibility for experience.
Longuenesse argues that, since there would be no empirical cognition at all without the self-identical I, the cognition of the I is not abstracted from experience. Yet she asserts that “I” and “person” are concepts that apply only to humans who experience the spatiotemporal world. Longuenesse accepts Kant’s view that humans are moral beings and, in this respect, have autonomy. Yet to have autonomy means to make choices between things that are experienced whilst living in the spatiotemporal world. In order to do so, Longuenesse argues, one has to have a living body, and the standard of the identity of a person is therefore the body which each diachronically cognises as belonging to oneself.
문제 번역:
14. Which of the following statements is supported by the passage?
(1) According to Kant, self-consciousness warrants the reality of the soul.
(2) According to Kant, the construction of thought is independent of the passage of time.
(3) According to Strawson, self-consciousness is a condition of possibility for cognition.
(4) According to Longuenesse, being alive is necessary in making choices in the spatiotemporal world.
15. Which of the following questions is answered by the third paragraph?
(1) How do the implications of the concept that connects “two premises” differ with respect to reality?
(2) With what grounds is the assumption that “multiple subjects are cognised as a self-identical person” refuted?
(3) What is the reason that makes the view that there is an open “possibility that the soul is real” untenable?
(4) What is the reason that we have to accept the view that the diachronic self-identity of the person can be “directly proved”?
(5) What is the reason that the premise “the soul is self-conscious” is no other than the premise “the thinking I thinks”?
16. Below is a note made by a student who read the passage. Which of the following statements in the note can NOT be inferred from the passage?
Let’s describe the views to which scholars can be said to be committed.
[Central Concept 1] Cognition of the I and Empirical Cognition
(1) Kant: thinks that the way of cognising the I differs from the way of empirically cognising the objects in the spatiotemporal world.
(2) Strawson: thinks that empirical cognition in the spatiotemporal world relies on cognition of the I.
[Central Concept 2] Abstraction Process
Strawson: agrees that the I can be cognised without going through the abstraction process from experience.
(3) Longuenesse: disagrees that the I can be cognised without going through the abstraction process from experience.
[Central Concept 3] Diachronic Person and Moral Being
(4) Kant, Longuenesse: accepts that humans as moral beings have autonomy.
(5) Kant, Strawson, Longuenesse: accepts the concept of “the I as the self-identical person persisting through the passage of time”.
17. Based on the passage, What is the most correct response to the following views?
[Views]
A: Let’s imagine that we scan the consciousness of a brain and simulate it in a programme. In this case the simulated consciousness is not identical to the original I, because the consciousness in the brain occurs with the contribution of the whole body. That is, a consciousness simulated in a programme cannot be a person. For the self-identity of a person cannot be warranted solely by the persistence of “the thinking I” and the living body must be incorporated as one of the constituents of a person.
B: That’s not true. The consciousness simulated in the programme is the person identical to the original I. For, although a programme has no body, there is no fundamental difference between the thinking functions performed by our brain and by the programme. The self-identity of a person should be judged solely in terms of the identity of this thinking function, without assuming anything else.
(1) According to Longuenesse’s view, A is right in claiming that a person can consist solely of a consciousness simulated in a programme.
(2) According to Strawson’s view, B is not right in claiming that no personality can be ascribed to beings without bodies.
(3) According to the predominant view before Kant, A is not right in claiming that the persistence of “the thinking I” does not alone warrant the self-identity of a person.
(4) According to Kant, B is right in claiming that the diachronic self-identity of a person is judged in terms of the identity of the thinking function without any preceding assumption on the person.
(5) According to Longuenesse, B is right in claiming that the thinking function, which can be performed by a non-human being, is the criterion for judging the self-identity of a person.
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