저는 영어 표현이나 문법에 아직 많이 서툽니다. 영어 오류를 발견하신 분들은 언제든지 댓글로 지적해주시면 감사하겠습니다. 글을 철저하게 첨삭해주시지 않으시더라도, 오류를 한두 개 정도 잡아주시는 것만으로 공부에 큰 도움이 됩니다.
Ⅰ. Introduction
In this presentation, I will claim a Darwinian approach to objectivity by explaining that what we take as knowledge is the result of natural selection. First, I will criticize Platonism, which lays the foundation of objectivity on the metaphysical correspondence between knowledge and reality (Ⅰ). Next, I will consider the two types of transcendentalism: the one of which suggests subjective conditions as the ground of objectivity and the other of which suggests mutual recognition as the ground of objectivity (Ⅱ). Last, I will argue that the second type of transcendentalism (social transcendentalism) is compatible with the Darwinian explanation of our natural life (Ⅲ).
Ⅱ. Platonism
Platonism believes that our knowledge of the world corresponds to reality. It understands objectivity or truth as an epistemic state that reflects the structure of reality. That is, according to Platonism, a theory is true if and only if it describes the object to which it corresponds. For example, the claim that Newtonian mechanics is true in the macroscopic world means to Platonists that it properly describes the structure of the macroscopic world. Here, the objectivity of Newtonian mechanics is regarded as established by the reality accessible to everyone (the macroscopic world).
However, it seems circular reasoning to claim that the objectivity of knowledge depends on reality. In order to compare our knowledge with reality, we have to know the structure of reality. The problem is that we cannot know the structure of reality before we get the knowledge of reality. If we know the structure (so if it is possible to compare our knowledge with reality), it means that we already know what reality is before we examine whether our knowledge is true. This conclusion presupposes what has to be proved, arguing that we know the structure of reality before we know it.
Ⅱ. Transcendentalism
Transcendentalism is a philosophical position claiming that objectivity depends not on the structure of reality but on the structure of our cognition. According to transcendentalism, because objectivity is what we constitute, there is no objectivity without our cognitive conditions for knowledge. The term ‘transcendental’ refers to these conditions that are necessary to knowledge but are not knowledge itself. Of course, transcendentalism tries to ‘go beyond’ our knowledge. However, the term ‘go beyond’ means ‘go to the conditions that are before or behind our knowledge’ (see Höffe, 1992: 47). For example, Kant (the founder of transcendentalism) argues that Newtonian mechanics is true only under our cognitive conditions, such as forms of sensibility (space and time) and concepts of the understanding (categories). We can divide two types of transcendentalism on the basis of whether ‘transcendental’ conditions are ‘subjective’ or ‘social.’
Ⅱ. 1. Subjective Transcendentalism
Some philosophers (including Kant) explain transcendental conditions as the subjective. They argue that people have a priori cognitive structures in their reason and always interpret the world according to the structures. Suppose that there is an imaginary person who has worn red glasses from birth. The person has never taken off them and always sees the red world through her red glasses. Our a priori cognitive structures are analogous to the superlative red glasses in this case. These are something that we have from birth, can never be removed, and always determines our cognition of the world.
The problem is that it is questionable how we can claim that there are a priori conditions for knowledge. As Platonism makes circular reasoning, subjective transcendentalism seems also to commit to a similar fallacy. In order to discover the a priori conditions, we can compare our knowledge (constituted result) with the world (pre-constituted reality). However, this is the possibility that subjective transcendentalism prohibits by claiming that we always interpret the world according to our cognitive structures (therefore, we cannot reach reality itself). If so, it is contradictory to argue that objectivity depends on ourselves and that there are a priori conditions for knowledge (objective structures independent from us).
Ⅱ. 2. Social Transcendentalism
Other philosophers (like Hegel) explain transcendental conditions as the social. According to them, the transcendental insight that objectivity depends on ourselves does not imply the claim that we have fixed structures or conditions for knowledge. The insight should be understood as that there is no objectivity itself that everyone agrees with. That is, what is objective is a matter of perspective. Here, a perspective is not the pure form of reason but our way of thinking, which is educated and changing in the social practice we participate in.
More specifically, social transcendentalists argue that knowledge is the result of mutual recognition . For example, the claim that Newtonian mechanics is true is that we recognize the authority of the community of scientists that teach it to us. By recognizing the perspective of the scientists, we try to interpret the whole world under the laws scientists postulate. If someone properly does this work, she is recognized by the scientists, as a person who has the knowledge (as a member of the society that accepts Newtonian mechanics as knowledge).
However, it is not inevitable for us to accept Newtonian mechanics if we do not want to recognize the authority of the community of scientists. It may be more fascinating for a shaman in a wild tribe to interpret the whole world from the animistic perspective by recognizing her traditional faith. We cannot claim that Newtonian mechanics is absolutely true but the animistic perspective is not. (To claim the absolute superiority of one view over the other is to presuppose objectivity as the independent from our recognition.) The point is that transcendental conditions for knowledge are the result of mutual recognition in society as Brandom says: “All transcendental constitution is social institution.” (see Brandom, 2019: 12; see Haugeland, 1982: 18)
Ⅲ. Social Transcendentalism with Darwinism
Social transcendentalism has distinguishing features different from subjective transcendentalism. By arguing that transcendental conditions are based on mutual recognition in social practice, it rejects the idea that there are unchangeable knowledge, objectivity, rationality, and reason. The fundamental beliefs we accept as conditions for the other knowledge of the world are changing according to the historical development of our society. That is, as our society adapts itself to new eras, the beliefs it takes have to prove themselves as useful or valuable for the eras. We can recapitulate these features of social transcendentalism with two conceptions: (a) ‘detranscendentalization’ and (b) ‘pragmatism.’
(a) Detranscendentalization: social transcendentalism deflates the meaning of ‘transcendental.’ While subjective transcendentalism postulates fixed transcendental conditions common to all people (rational beings), social transcendentalism denies that there is the universal structure of reason. One of its emphases is that the criteria of rationality are constantly changing as time goes on. What is objective is also determined by the criteria of each era and varies from era to era. Therefore, in social transcendentalism, the meaning of ‘transcendental’ descends from the timeless realm to our history (see Habermas, 2003: 17-22).
(b) Pragmatism: social transcendentalism belongs to a kind of pragmatism. It claims that each criterion of rationality has to prove its utility. Of course, social transcendentalism does not postulate absolute utility, which transcends each era and culture. However, even though there is no absolute utility, it is justified to say that a belief has relative utility if it can successfully cope with problems that occur in our daily life (see Habermas, 2003: 15-16). That is, it is possible to evaluate what is rational on the basis of whether it is useful to deal with our problems. Objectivity can be understood in these cases as a property of rational theories.
These two features make social transcendentalism close to Darwinism. Because social transcendentalism argues that a theory proven to be useful to our problems in history can be regarded as objective, its explanation of objectivity is analogous with the Darwinian natural selection theory of evolution. As natural selection theory claims that evolution is the result of ‘struggles for existence,’ social transcendentalism also emphasizes that our current knowledge is the survivors from struggles to prove their utility. That is, according to social transcendentalism, while the survived theories remain as knowledge, the failed theories become extinct. The principle of natural selection is applied not only to the evolution of life but also to the development of knowledge.
In order to make the natural selection theory of knowledge more clear, let us use a myth of how modus ponens became a universal rule of inference. Suppose there were two tribes of people in the prehistoric era: one of which acted and thought according to modus ponens but the other of which did not. Both tribes knew, ‘If leaves of trees fall, then winter comes,’ by their experience of the change of seasons. However, while the first tribe prepared the coming winter when they saw falling leaves, the second tribe did not because they could not draw the conclusion, ‘Winter comes,’ from the premises, ‘If leaves of trees fall, then winter comes,’ and ‘Leaves of trees fall.’ Therefore, as time went on, while many of the people in the first tribe survived from winters, the people in the second tribe decreased every winter. Finally, the descendants of the first tribe, who act and think according to modus ponens, became the dominant humankind, and modus ponens became a universal rule of inference.
What this myth intends is not to reveal the history but to tell a story of how a belief can get objectivity without depending on the metaphysical reality. Of course, it is a myth that positive historical investigations cannot prove. However, it is a pretty plausible myth as far as we (contemporary people) accept Darwinism as a scientific explanation of our natural life. Even though the myth itself does not give reasons to believe our knowledge but makes a hypothesis of the genesis of the knowledge (in other words, it does not justify but merely explains the knowledge), it seems hard to deny that the myth is the best causal account under our scientific understanding of natural history.
The combination of social transcendentalism and Darwinism implies the possibility of objectivity without metaphysical reality . That is, the natural selection of knowledge theory does not postulate any kind of metaphysical reality to explain objectivity. For what is objective is what has successfully survived. However, the denial of metaphysical reality does not imply any kind of skepticism of objectivity. For what has successfully survived is accepted as better than what has not. Therefore, it is no contradiction to claim that there is no metaphysical reality but some knowledge objectively satisfies our experience more than others. (see van Fraassen, 1980: 6-13) We can claim that if a belief has more ‘survival value’ (Sellars, 1991: 326; Millikan, 2005: 83) than others, it becomes objective knowledge through the ‘natural history of human beings.’ (Wittgenstein, 1968: §415)
References
Brandom, R., A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019.
Habermas, J., Truth and Justification, B. Fultner (trans.), Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003.
Haugeland, J., “Heidegger on Being a Person,” Noûs, Vol. 16(1), 1982, 15-26
Höffe, O., Immanuel Kant, M. Farrier (trans.), Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
Millikan, R. G., “The Son and the Daughter: On Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan,” Language: A Biological Model, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005.
Sellars, W., “Some Reflections on Language Games,” Science, Perception and Reality, Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1991, 321-358.
Van Fraassen, B. C., The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968.