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https://blog.naver.com/ernest_scribbler/222536267425
Précis of Anti-luminosity of Phenomenal Mental States
1. Introduction
-Anti-luminosity Argument (henceforth, ALA), presented by an eminent philosopher Timothy Williamson, is a challenge against the traditional Cartesian conception of self-knowledge.
-According to Cartesian (or Lockean) view on mind, we are always in a position to know whether we are in certain mental state.
-With ALA, Williamson argues that it is false. We are not always in a position to know whether we are in certain mental state. That means it is possible that we do not know that we are in certain mental state even when we are in fact in that state.
-There are two subcategories of mental states: intentional and phenomenal. But here I am going to concern only with phenomenal mental states, such as pain, feeling cold etc.
2. Argument and Objections
-Clarifying concept. Let us refer the condition that we can always in a position to know whether it obtains or not as luminous condition. A condition C is luminous if and only if, if C obtains then S knows that C obtains. Now, phenomenal mental states conceived in Cartesian view can be considered as luminous.
-Thought Experiment: Cold Morning
Suppose S stands outside at 6:00 a.m. She will stand there until the noon. Let t0 be the initial time point and tn be the terminal point. And divide the duration into very short intervals, like millisecond, and assign tk for each time point. To each time point tk, there is a case ak, a possible state of affair with fixed agent and environment. She feels cold at the first place(a0), but it gradually gets warm and eventually she does not feel cold at noon(an) anymore.
(LUM) If S feels cold in ai, then S knows that she feels cold in ai.
(MAR) If S knows that she feels cold in ai, then S feels cold in ai+1.
Two premises together yield contradiction. (For detailed reasoning, see Appendix 1) But the reasoning is valid, thus one of the premises should be rejected. Williamson argues that (LUM) should be rejected, because (MAR) can be justified.
-What is (MAR) and how can it be justified?
Knowledge eliminates some possibilities. If S knows p, then S’s evidence eliminates possibilities in which not-p. But our evidence, particularly perceptual evidence, usually has a margin for error. Suppose you are estimating the height of a tree in front of you. The tree is in fact 20m high, and you guess so. Does your belief constitute knowledge? No, it doesn’t. You cannot discriminate 19m high tree or 21m high tree from 20m high tree, so your evidence (visual perception) does not eliminate the possibilities in which the tree is not 20m high. What you can know, then, is that the height of the tree is in between 19m and 21m. And for that, your visual evidence eliminates all the possibilities in which it is not true. This in fact says that there should be no falsity in remaining possibilities. So, what you know is true in all nearby possible cases. This is what (MAR) says.
Now (MAR) can be deduced from two plausible premises: the safety condition of knowledge (SAF), and limited capacity of discrimination (BEL). (Here, ai and ai+1 are set as indiscriminable to S.) (See Appendix 2)
(SAF) If S knows p in ai, then if S believes p in ai+1, then p in ai+1.
(BEL) If S believes p in ai, then S believes p in ai+1.
To sum up, Williamson constructed ALA by making a thought experiment with which (LUM) and (MAR) together yields contradiction through valid reasoning. He argued that since (MAR) can be deduced by plausible premises (SAF) and (BEL), (LUM) should be rejected.
-Selim Berker presented two objections against ALA:
(1) (MAR) is not justified, because its justifying premise (BEL) is soritical premise. So, Williamson is not entitled to reject (LUM) on the ground of justified (MAR).
(2) Williamson presupposes that there is no constitutive connection between phenomenal states and doxastic states about the phenomenal states. Since some luminists hold their view because they believe that there is such connection, simply assuming that there is no such connection will be question-begging.
3. Reply to the first objection
-Berker argues that (BEL) is notorious soritical premise. Because we can make a valid reasoning from “S believes p in a0” and (BEL) to “S believes p in an”, for whatever n we like. (Think about “being bold” case) For it is not acceptable, (MAR) is not justified.
-I argue that (BEL) is not itself soritical but appeared to be soritical by virtue of the presumption involved in the initial setting of Cold Morning case. If we construct thought experiment does not involve such presumption, it will be shown that (BEL) is not soritical but ALA still works.
-Firstly, I insist that (BEL) is not itself soritical. To restate (BEL), it turns out “if S believes p in ai and ai and ai+1 is indiscriminable to S, then S believes p in ai+1.” This is not straightforwardly soritical. But under certain circumstance, where the second conjunct of the antecedent was always satisfied, it would be soritical. And Cold Morning is such a case.
-I believe that there are two particular presumptions implicitly lies in Cold Morning: (1) two nearby cases ai and ai+1 are indiscriminable to S by comparing experiences and (2) there is no effective method for S to discriminate nearby cases except comparing experiences.
-Here is the explication. Discriminability requires methodological basis. It is possible that two things are indiscriminable by method M but discriminable by method N. The idea can be generalized as “If any two cases are discriminable to S, then there is an effective method available to S, by which S identifies the difference between the cases.” If this is correct, (1) and (2) above yields that for all i, nearby cases ai and ai+1 are indiscriminable to S.
-Next, let’s revise the original situation. What if the agent S had another method on which she can rely to discriminate cases? Here I suggest the cognitive capacity of retention. Now S has an ability required to say “Wait, I noticed that something has changed now, comparing to the case few seconds ago.”
-Going back to the Cold Morning. Take a fragment of the total time duration. Suppose that from a0 to a10 S does not discriminate nearby cases either by comparing experiences or retention. In a11 S notice that something has changed by activating retention. Then, a10 and a11 are discriminable cases, not by comparing experiences but by retention. In this situation, (BEL) still holds, since it is vacuously true, but does not yield soritical conclusion.
-On the other hand, ALA still works in this changed situation. Suppose S feels cold until in a9 and S does not feel cold in a10. By applying ALA with (LUM) and (MAR), the contradiction follows.
-To sum up, I have argued that Berker’s objection against (BEL) is not successful. He argued that (BEL) is soritical but the soritical feature of (BEL) does not come from (BEL) itself but from the particular settings of Cold Morning.
4. Reply to the second objection
-Berker also argues that Williamson presupposes that there is no constitutive connection between phenomenal states and doxastic states. Berker thinks it seems obvious that there is such constitutive connection and insists that it is question-begging to merely assume that there is no such connection.
-I agree with the intuitive idea that there should be some intimate relation between phenomenal states and doxastic states. It sounds implausible that they can “swing apart” from each other. But what “constitutive connection” mean is not clear.
-If “constitutive connection” means some sort of ontologically necessary relation between two states, it would be too strong and implausible. It is possible that two physical states that each constitutes phenomenal states and doxastic states are disconnected by serious damage.
-Rather I suggest there can be constitutive connection at conceptual level. And if the constitutive connection is understood in conceptual sense, ALA can work under such conceptual connection.
-The conceptual framework I adopt in this section is functionalist approach and functional definition in philosophy of mind. (cf. David Lewis, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identification”) According to the method, we can define mental terms with the general theory of causal relation among mental states, say, folk psychology, that involves that mental terms.
-For short, I suggest a toy-model of folk psychological structure in which the doxastic state of believing that S feels cold can be caused not only by the phenomenal state of feeling cold under proper attention, but also by other source like prior belief in retention. Then, two states in question have intimate connection in virtue of the functional definitions of the terms by which they are referred, but belief that one feels cold can occur without feeling cold.
5. Concluding Remarks
-Theoretically, I believe my research concerns unneglectable feature of self-knowledge when we try to put knowledge in the total folk psychological map.
-More interesting point is that to what extent the feature of anti-luminosity can be applied. What about belief? Are we always in a position to know whether we believe something or not? We can ask similar questions against rational belief and knowledge. Williamson simply generalize the result of anti-luminosity argument presented above, but I doubt it. These topics seem to require much inquiry.
Appendix 1 (LUM) and (MAR) yield contradiction under Cold Morning
Ⅰ0. S feels cold in a0. (by settings of Cold Morning)
Ⅱ0. S knows that she feels cold in a0. (Ⅰ0, (LUM), Modus Ponens)
Ⅰ1. S feels cold in a1. (Ⅱ0, (MAR), Modus Ponens)
By iterating given procedure, we have “S feels cold in an.”(Ⅰn) which contradicts the supposition of Cold Morning.
Appendix 2 Deduction of (MAR) from (SAF) and (BEL)
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Suppose that S knows p in ai. (Assumption for Conditional Proof)
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If S knows p in ai, then S believes p in ai. (Knowledge implies Belief)
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S believes p in ai. (1, 2 MP)
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If S believes p in ai, then S believes p in ai+1. (BEL)
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S believes p in ai+1.
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If S knows p in ai, then if S believes p in ai+1, then p in ai+1.
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p in ai+1.
Therefore, If S knows p in ai, then p in ai+1. (MAR)