#1) Senseless (sinnlos)
‘Senseless,’ or in the original German, ‘sinnlos,’ is one of the three main categories used in the Tractatus to classify propositions (Sätze). The Tractarian concept of ‘sinnlos’ is particularly crucial for understanding the nature of logical propositions (die logischen Sätze).
According to Tractarian accounts of language, every proposition belongs to one of the following three categories: ‘sinnvoll,’ ‘sinnlos,’ and ‘unsinnig.’ When clarifying the distinction between ‘sinnvoll’ and ‘sinnlos,’ it is worth noting that the German suffixes ‘-voll’ and ‘-los’ correspond to the English suffixes ‘-ful’ and ‘-less,’ respectively. On the one hand, a proposition with a sense (i.e., ein sinnvoller Satz) is a picture of reality and thereby must be either true or false (but not both) (4.01, 4.06). Propositions of natural science, for instance, belong to this category (4.11). On the other hand, a senseless proposition lacks a sense and cannot be a picture of reality, despite being part of the symbolism (4.461-4.462). Logical propositions, i.e., tautologies and contradictions, are categorized as being senseless (4.46).
While both a proposition with a sense and a senseless proposition are part of the symbolism of our language and have their truth-values, nonsensical (unsinnig) pseudo-propositions are made by the infringement of the rules of logical syntax, being neither true nor false (3.325, 4,003). The German word ‘Unsinn’ corresponds to the English word ‘Nonsense’ in that both can be used to refer to gibberish. Ethical, aesthetical, and religious propositions are described as nonsense, notwithstanding that they seem to hold special significance in the Tractarian worldview (I will address this issue later with more details).
Then, why does Wittgenstein consider logical propositions as being senseless, and yet unlike nonsense, still belonging to the symbolism of our language? To understand his thoughts, we must first distinguish logical propositions from logical properties. According to the Tractatus, the fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the logical properties of language and the world (6.12). Plus, Wittgenstein often calls the latter simply “logic,” as follows: “The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics” (6.22). In a nutshell, the function of the former is related to showing the latter. This is done by combining meaningful propositions into the proposition of logic that says nothing, called a zero-method (6.121). In the proposition of logic, the original propositions (conjuncts or disjuncts) would have lost their sense (This is the reason why all the logical propositions are senseless). But at the same time, their logical properties are demonstrated by the fact that the proposition of logic is a tautology. For example, the fact that ‘∼(p.∼p)’ is a tautology shows that ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ contradict each other; the tautology ‘(p⊃q).(p):⊃:(q)’ shows that ‘q’ follows from ‘p’ and ‘p⊃q’; the tautology ‘(x).fx :⊃: fa’ shows that ‘fa’ follows from ‘(x).fx.’ (6.1201).
It is also worth noting that tautologies and contradictions are still truth-functional, i.e., truth-functions of elementary propositions (die Elementarsätze) (5 ff). As Glock notes, “The truth-value of a molecular proposition depends on those of the ELEMENTARY PROPOSITIONS of which it is a truth-function. Among the truth-functional combinations of propositions there are two limiting cases [i.e., tautologies and contradictions]” (Glock 1996: 355). In this regard, tautologies and contradictions, like ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of arithmetic, belong to the symbolism of our language (4.4611).
#2) Nonsense (Unsinn) (OR sometimes translate “Unsinn” as “senseless”)
As mentioned above, nonsense can be defined as the result of failing to comply with the rules of logical syntax (3.325). Unlike a proposition with a sense, nonsense cannot depict (abbilden) any reality, nor can it represent (darstellen) the possibility of reality (2.06, 2.17, 2.201). Since “a proposition is a picture of reality” (4.01), nonsense cannot be considered a picture at all. Because “the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity” (2.222), nonsense can be neither true nor false. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not even a proposition (Satz), notwithstanding that it can still be regarded as a sentence (Satz); Wittgenstein sometimes calls it a pseudo-proposition for this reason (e.g., 4.1272).
When accepting this interpretation, ‘nonsense’ appears to be interchangeable with the word ‘gibberish.’ Like “piggly wiggle tiggle,” it cannot convey any sense (Diamond 2000: 151). The only difference between “piggly wiggle tiggle” and philosophical nonsense is that the latter only seems to make sense. But what really happened in such cases is that “we have failed to give a meaning to some of its constituents (even if we think that we have done so.)” (5.4733). This is because our ordinary language disguises this fact by making philosophical nonsense seem superficially similar to a proposition with a sense. Accordingly, Wittgenstein holds that our ordinary usage of language is the origin of all the confusion that has occurred in philosophy. We must use a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar (logical syntax) to avoid such an illusion (3.325). He said:
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language (4.0003).
Several scholars, like Ayer and Carnap, defended and developed this account, claiming that the Tractatus essentially represents the anti-metaphysical view. However, regarding nonsense merely as a product of confusion not only oversimplifies Wittgenstein’s thoughts but can also lead to a distortion of them.
The distinction between metaphysical propositions and metaphysical truths may shed light on what he thought about philosophical nonsense. Hacker presents “numerous truths that seemingly cannot be stated, but which are nevertheless apparently asserted in the course of the Tractatus,” organizing them into ten categories (Hacker 2000: 353-355). In fact, Wittgenstein has never argued that such truths do not exist and are mere illusions. What he considered an illusion is the thought that we can speak about such truths. For instance, what Russell tried to say by suggesting the theory of types is “exactly what one can’t say” (Wittgenstein 2008: 99). Moreover, we cannot use formal concepts such as ‘complex’, ‘fact’, ‘function’, ‘number’ in a proposition with a sense, for they are represented in conceptual notation by variables (4.1272). Namely, the fact that there are two objects is expressed by ‘(∃x, y)’, not by the pseudo-proposition, “there are two objects” (4.1272).
Thus, based on this understanding, the pseudo-proposition “there are two objects” is not just the same as “piggly wiggle tiggle.” Such a proposition can be better characterized as the residual product of a failed attempt to say the ineffable. In this regard, Hacker encapsulates the fundamental idea of the Tractatus as the doctrine “that the necessary truths of logic are senseless, and that all other putatively necessary truths cannot be said but can only be shown” (Hacker 2000: 370).
References
Diamond, C. (2000), “Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, in: A. Crary and R. Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein , London and New York: Routledge, pp. 149-173.
Glock, H. J. (1996), A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell.
Hacker, P. M. S. (2000), “Was He Trying to Whistle It?” in: A. Crary and R. Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 353-389.
Wittgenstein, L. (TLP), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge, 1961; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , in: Werkausgabe Bd. 1, 23. Aufl. hrsausgegeben von J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2019.
Wittgenstein, L. (2008), Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents, 1911–1951, 4th Ed. edited by B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell.