먼저 유의미한 논평과 뼈같은 조언을 해주신 Raccoon선생님, Skim9선생님, YOUN선생님께
진심으로 감사드립니다. 강한 반례를 찾을때까지 더욱 노력하겠습니다.
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I. Definition of Theory-ladenness of perceptual observation
Cheon Hyundeuk (hereinafter referred to as Prof. Cheon) views Theory-Ladenness of Observation as the case that observation and sight experience is influenced by background knowledge and theory, criticizing Foundationalism science is justified by neutral observation. It is not like that Prof. Cheon insists every observation is Theory-ladenness like strong Theory-ladenness. Prof. Cheon insists some observation is Theory-ladenness like weakened Theory-ladenness.
In this context, Prof. Cheon supports the Theory-ladenness of perceptual observation, which means weakened Theory-ladenness, and defines it as follows in his paper.
If two scientists who have different theories in part (or A scientist who
undergoes theoretical change) observe the same area, they could have
different experiences. : (∀x)(Sx⊃Dx)
Then Prof. Cheon insists this definition shows Theory-ladenness of perceptual observation occurs in the scientific world as opposed to Bird who doesn’t accept the perceptual experience of scientists is affected by theoretical belief as a critic of Thomas Kuhn
II. Contradiction and Cheon Hyundeuk ’s predicable contradiction
However, I would like to criticize Prof. Cheon‘s definition, revealing a counterexample. First I would like to start with negating his previous definition. And we can re-justify the previous contradiction as follows.
Two scientists who have different theories in part (or A scientist who
undergoes theoretical change) observe the same area and they could
not have a different experience. : -(∀x)(Sx⊃Dx) = (∃x)(Sx&-Dx)
As an example of contradiction that two scientists could have the same experience, I would like to present Müller-Lyer Illusion. Prof. Kim Kihyeon views Müller-Layer Illusion as the case one line is concave and the other is convex. On the other hand, I accept Müller-Lyer Illusion as the case observing ruler is more accurate than observing eyes. When Prof. Kim and I who have different theory saw Müller-Lyer Illusion, we can undergo the same experience that one is longer than the other.
In terms of the previous counterexample, There is Prof. Cheon’s predicable contradiction to my criticism logically.
Two scientists who have different theories in part (or A scientist who undergoes
theoretical change) don’t observe the same area or they could have different
experiences. : (∀x)(-Sx∨Dx)
III. Criticism of Cheon Hyundeuk’s predicable contradiction
If Prof. Cheon shows his predicable contradiction as true, he should require -Sx or Dx is true at least. Because I illustrate an example of the same experience as Müller-Lyer Illusion, Therefore Prof. Cheon might show -Sx is true, which means Sx is false.
However, Prof. Cheon can’t argue Sx is false. If Prof. Cheon negates two scientists who have different theories in part (or A scientist who undergoes theoretical change), he negates his example of Theory-ladenness of perceptual observation or salience. For example, While Galilei and An Aristotelian physicist have a different opinions on pendulum movement, The attention-mediated top-down effects which focus on attention-borne means observation experience is laded on theory. To put it simply, Two scientists who have different theories observe the same phenomenon, they have different experiences according to what they are interested in, which means scientific progress as Kuhn said. Therefore If Prof. Cheon considers Sx as false, it leads to his denial of the scientific paradigm.
Lastly, Someone raises the question does Müller-Lyer Illusion truly criticize his definition. Prof. Cheon recognizes attention as the case of cognitive penetrability when attention itself is deemed as high-level recognition and has a potential conclusion like Theory-ladenness or cognitive circulation. Besides Prof. Cheon dismisses the case of duck-rabbit Illusion, which has a different experience as focusing on duck or rabbit. But Müller-Lyer Illusion enables us to have the same experience.
That is, not to deny the whole Theory-ladenness of perceptual observation, I would like to suggest Prof. Cheon's definition should be changed.
Reference
Cheon Hyundeuk (2020), Cognitive Penetration of Perception and Theory-Ladeness of Observation, Philosophy of Science, vol.23(1) pp. 75-107.
Bosuk Yoon (2021), Cognitive Penetration, Consequentialism, and Empirical Rationality : with a focus on Prof. Cheon’s discussion, Philosophy of Science, vol.24(2) pp. 1-29.
Bird, A. (2000), Thomas Kuhn, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ; as cited in Cheon Hyundeuk (2020)
YOUN, <Argument, Contradiction, Re-contradtion : P⊃Q, P&-Q, -P∨Q, Miscellaneous thoughts and fantasies, 2017, 주장, 비판, 재비판: P⊃Q, P&-Q, -P∨Q : 네이버 블로그
Bird, <Criticism of Kim-Kihyeon’s Müller-Lyer Illusion Interpretation>, OwlofSogang, 2021, Criticism of Kim-Kihyeon’s Müller-Lyer Illusion Interpretation