발표를 경청해주신 Skim9선생님, Raccoon선생님, P선생님께 감사드립니다.
더불어 부족한 발표에 유의미한 논평과 조언을 해주신 Skim9, Raccoon선생님께 진심으로 감사드립니다.
————————————————————————————————————
I. Miranda Fricker’s Credibility Deficit
Miranda Fricker distinguishes between Testimonial Injustice and Hermeneutical Injustice in Epistemic Injustice. First, Testimonial Injustice occurs when the hearer doesn’t believe the speaker on credibility deficit owing to a kind of bias. Next Hermeneutical Injustice occurs when the speaker doesn’t know how to convey what the speaker experience. To give an example, there is an employee who is sexually harassed by her(his) boss. Then the employee doesn’t know how to explain this situation, which is commonly referred to as sexual harassment in the workplace. So the employee can’t speak proper testimony to explain the situation that she(he) experienced. Ultimately It leads to her(his) distracted testimony.
Let’s back to the main point. Before Epistemic injustice, the cause of Epistemic injustice is credibility deficit or negative prejudice. So Miranda Fricker views the social negative prejudices as denigrating the epistemic character of the members of that group, affecting how they are perceived. And Miranda Fricker also points out the subjects stigmatized by negative identity prejudices are considered abnormal subjects, which lead to testimonial injustice.[1]
Thus Miranda Fricker focuses on the Testimonial Injustice concretely, illustrating a trial in , whose plot is as follows. A black man Tom is falsely accused by A white girl Mayella. Regardless of his innocent evidence, the jury doesn’t recognize it. Ultimately the judge declares Tom guilty. The trial in shows a straightforward struggle between the power of evidence and the power of racial prejudice.[2] The jury and the judge don’t need to believe a black man Tom’s testimony due to his race, which means Credibility Deficit.
II. Jose Medina’s Credibility Excess
However, Credibility Excess is of paramount importance to Jose Medina. Jose Medina focuses on Credibility Excess, illustrating a trial in as Miranda Fricker did. Jose Medina agrees with Miranda Fricker’s view but spontaneously points out her missing, Credibility Excess.
Jose Medina points out Credibility Excess which Miranda Fricker overlooked.[3] To come back as a case in , The reason why people don’t believe a black man Tom is people would like to give a Credibility Excess to White girl Mayella. Therefore people weigh Mayella’s testimony, neglecting whatever is testified as evidence.
Ultimately Jose Medina concludes credibility should be divided in fair proportionality to solve the testimonial injustice problem. Because Jose Medina considers Credibility as a relative interactive nature, which has an aspect of comparative or contrastive.[4], which means we can believe something more credible while can believe something less credible. Therefore we don’t give weight to the skin, sex and a kind of features.
III. My conclusion
But I would like to suggest a different standard for it. As the cause of Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker and Jose Medina suggest the Credibility deficit and Credibility excess in part. I think It could be divided into Feministic views and Racial views. In the Feministic view, Credibility Deficit is explainable, while Credibility Excess is explainable in the racial view. Because in feministic view, it is adjacent that women are damaged in low credibility. On the other hand, in racial view, it is adjacent that white men benefit in high credibility.
IV. Reference
Jose Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, Oxford University Press, 2013
Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford University Press, 2007
Grasswick, Heidi, "Feminist Social Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/feminist-social-epistemology/.
Kim Seonjung, Testimonial Injustice 1221, Owls Weekly English Seminar.
————————————————————————————————
- Jose Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.58
- Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.23
- Miranda Fricker mentioned as follows. “The primary characterization of testimonial injustice … remains such that it is a matter of credibility deficit and not credibility excess”(2007, pp.21)
- Jose Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp.61