스티븐 에반스(C. Stephen Evans)의 God & Moral Obligation이라는 신명윤리 저서를 읽고 있는데, 헤겔과 브랜덤의 이론에 근거한 실용주의 윤리학에 대한 언급이 등장하네요. 에반스는 제프리 스타우트(Jeffrey Stout)의 입장을 논평의 대상으로 삼고 있는데, 스타우트는 브랜덤의 이론에 근거해서 윤리가 사회적 실천을 바탕으로 해명되어야 한다는 입장을 제시합니다. 흥미롭게도, 에반스는 (a) 도덕적 지식이 우리의 사회적 실천에 내재되어 있다는 스타우트와 브랜덤의 입장을 긍정적으로 평가하면서도, (b) 그 입장이 자칫 사회의 기성 규범이나 실천에 대한 문제제기를 차단한 채 사회 자체를 '신'으로 만들 위험이 있다고 키에르케고어적 관점에서 비판을 제기하고, (c) 이런 문제를 극복하기 위해서는 윤리의 객관성과 초월성을 보장하는 형이상학이 다시 요구되어야 한다고 주장하네요.
Stout’s account of morality closely follows his interpretation of contemporary Hegelian philosopher Robert Brandom, who gives Hegel’s ethical philosophy a pragmatic reading. Hegel’s ethics gives a distinctive role to what Hegel calls Sittlichkeit, which is embodied in “the laws and customs” of modern societies. Sittlichkeit for Hegel embodies in a concrete way the demand of reason, which has been actualizing itself in human history. Brandom, without embracing Hegel’s metaphysics of “Absolute Spirit,” also sees ethics as an attempt to make explicit the norms that are embedded in the social practices of contemporary societies. Stout similarly sees our ethical norms as “creatures of discursive social practices,” in that they are the product of our attempts to reflect on the norms that are already implicit in our practices.
In one sense I believe that Stout is correct. I believe that humans, both as individuals and societies, have some moral knowledge, and this moral knowledge is embedded in our beliefs and practices. I have already repeatedly argued that humans can reasonably believe and even know at least some of their moral obligations, regardless of whether they have any adequate explanation of the source of those obligations. If this is the case, then it certainly is plausible that reflection on our moral practices will sometimes, perhaps frequently in some societies, give us insight into our moral obligations. Robert Adams, who is, as we have seen, the foremost defender of a DCT, goes so far as to say that Sittlichkeit might be one of the ways in which God makes knowledge of his commands possible. (Although I have already expressed some skepticism about this aspect of Adams’ view.)
However, to say that we can gain knowledge of morality by reflection on social practices does not mean that those social practices can adequately ground morality. What is lacking is an account of the authority of the norms that are embedded in our social practices. Hegel provides such an account by a metaphysics in which human societies are interpreted as expressions of God or Spirit. It was in fact exactly this metaphysics which inspired Kierkegaard’s protest on behalf of the individual against Hegel. Kierkegaard insisted that an authentic individual such as Socrates could be justified in rejecting the norms and practices of his society. To say otherwise is to make of society itself a god.
Stout, however, clearly wants to distance himself from anything like Hegel’s metaphysics. Just as clearly, Stout wants to avoid any deification of existing social norms. He wants to affirm that in some sense moral norms are “objective,” which means that everyone in our society could be mistaken about those norms. The crucial question is whether this objectivity requires that moral obligations have some kind of reality, or at least be rooted in reality in some way. Stout claims that no “realist” account of moral truth is necessary. He gives an analysis of different ways we use the term “truth,” distinguishing, among others, the “equivalence use,” and the “cautionary use.” The equivalence use is seen in expressions like “‘One ought to keep one’s promises’ is true if and only if one ought to keep one’s promises.” This use focuses our attention on the fact that truth of a proposition is determined by the subject matter, what a proposition is about, rather than what the speaker thinks or says. The cautionary use is reflected in statements such as “P is our best moral theory but it might not be true,” which points to what we might call the transcendent character of moral truth.
These characteristics of moral truth are precisely those that moral realists have sought to safeguard against various forms of expressivism and subjectivism, which are seen by realists as undermining the objectivity and transcendence of morality. So far as I can see, Stout gives no account of how moral truths can have these characteristics. He rejects any attempt to give morality a “metaphysical” foundation (and here the term “metaphysics” seems to be functioning mainly as a pejorative term of abuse). However, he provides no plausible account of his own as to how moral truths can possess the objectivity and transcendence he sees it as having.
C. Stephen Evans, God & Moral Obligation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 49-50.
인터넷을 뒤져보니, 에반스가 키에르케고어 전문가였군요. 키에르케고어가 헤겔을 비판하면서 실존주의적 관점에서 신명윤리를 제시한 것처럼, 에반스도 브랜덤과 스타우트를 비판하면서 비슷한 결에서 신명윤리를 제시하는 것 같습니다. 물론, 에반스는 키에르케고어보다는 훨씬 형이상학적 성향이 강한 것 같기는 합니다만, 브랜덤에 대한 논의가 등장하기 바로 직전 부분에서, 에반스가 롤스의 정의론에 대해 의문을 제기하면서, 과연 모든 가치관이나 맥락이 탈색된 순수하게 '공적인' 영역이 존재할 수나 있는지 지적하는 내용은 보편적 윤리나 합리성에 대한 일종의 키에르케고어적 비판이라고도 할 수 있을 것 같더라고요.
개인적으로는, 브랜덤과 스타우트에 대한 에반스의 문제제기 자체는 유의미하다고 보지만, 에반스의 형이상학적 성향에는 다소 동의하기 어렵네요. 오히려 저는 또 다른 개신교 철학자인 제임스 스미스(James Smith)가 강조하는 것처럼, 브랜덤의 실용주의야말로 종교적 윤리관와 굉장히 친화적일 수 있고, 키에르케고어적인 포스트모더니즘도 충분히 포용할 수 있다고 봅니다. 스미스는 Who's Afraid of Relativism이라는 저서에서 비트겐슈타인, 로티, 브랜덤을 자양분으로 삼아 기독교를 옹호할 뿐만 아니라, 심지어 자신의 개인 블로그에는 "로버트 브랜덤을 주신 하나님께 감사합니다(Thanks Be to God for Robert Brandom)"라는 글까지 써두었을 정도죠. (국내에는 스미스의 책 중에 『누가 포스트모더니즘을 두려워하는가?』와 『자크 데리다』 등이 번역되어 있는데, 제목에서부터 잘 드러나듯이, 스미스는 전통적인 형이상학과는 거리가 먼 현대 대륙철학을 전공한 인물입니다.)
여하튼, 에반스의 책을 사실 별 생각 없이 읽고 있었는데, 예상 밖의 흥미로운 내용들이 많이 나와서 은근히 재미있습니다. 지난 번에 데이비드 바게트(David Baggett)와 제리 L. 월즈(Jerry L. Walls) 또 다른 신명윤리 저서인『선하신 하나님: 도덕성의 유신론적 근거』(Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality)를 읽었을 때는 크립키와 퍼트남의 외재주의적 의미론으로 에우티프론의 딜레마를 해결하려는 시도가 굉장히 특이하다고 생각했는데, 에반스의 책은 헤겔과 키에르케고어가 등장하고 브랜덤까지 언급되니 또 새로운 느낌이네요. 전혀 예상치 못한 곳에서 익숙한 이름들을 만나니, 외국에서 한국 사람 만나는 느낌이랄까요.