- Ich sage: “Dort steht ein Sessel”. Wie, wenn ich hingehe und ihn holen will und er entschwindet plötzlich meinem Blick? — “Also war es kein Sessel, sondern irgend eine Täuschung.” — Aber in ein paar Sekunden sehen wir ihn wieder und können ihn angreifen, etc. — “Also war der Sessel doch da und sein Verschwinden war irgend eine Täuschung.” — Aber nimm an, nach einer Zeit verschwindet er wieder, a oder scheint zu verschwinden. Was sollen wir nun sagen? Hast du für solche Fälle Regeln bereit, a die sagen, ob man so etwas noch “Sessel” nennen darf? Aber gehen sie uns beim Gebrauch des Wortes “Sessel” ab; und sollen wir sagen, daß wir mit diesem Wort eigentlich keine Bedeutung verbinden, da wir nicht für alle Möglichkeiten seiner Anwendung mit Regeln ausgerüstet sind?
- I say, “There is a chair over there”. What if I go to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from sight? — “So it wasn’t a chair, but some kind of illusion.” — But a few seconds later, we see it again and are able to touch it, and so on. — “So the chair was there after all, and its disappearance was some kind of illusion.” — But suppose that after a time it disappears again a or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for such cases a rules saying whether such a thing is still to be called a “chair”? But do we miss them when we use the word “chair”? And are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?
In §80, Wittgenstein presents a series of bizarre examples that arguably baffle readers. In that example, what is considered a chair disappears and reappears abruptly, making us reluctant to call it a chair. A question then arises: What is Wittgenstein’s main point in presenting this cryptic case? Does he simply want to suggest that we could dismiss such a scenario when using the word ‘chair’? In the present paper, I aim to elucidate his primary target when he illustrated this example.
At first glance, the example is so far-fetched that it does not defeat any philosophical claim at all. As the last sentence indicates, however, it is deliberately intended to challenge a certain philosophical position held by Frege, Russell, and the early Wittgenstein: “And are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?” (PI: § 80; my emphasis) According to Baker & Hacker, Wittgenstein’s question reveals the defect of “Frege’s conception of determinacy of sense,” according to which a concept-word must be completely defined (Baker & Hacker 2005: 178). Since Frege thought the complete definition of a concept-word will determine which objects fall under that concept, he considers a concept as a circumscribed domain (Baker & Hacker 2005: 178; PI: § 71). On the contrary,
A concept without sharp boundaries would correspond to a region that would not have a sharp borderline everywhere but would, in places, be completely blurred, merging with its surroundings. This would not really be a region at all; and, correspondingly, a concept without sharp definition is wrongly called a concept. (BLA: §56)
For Wittgenstein, this view is mistaken; we cannot provide definitive rules for determining which object is a chair or not. Nor does this fact preclude us from the actual use of the word ‘chair.’ In this respect, Frege’s requirement is not only too stringent, but also overly obsessed with commonality.
A related issue could be raised against Russell’s theory of definite descriptions as well. In §79, Wittgenstein considers Russell’s claim that proper names are disguised expressions of definite descriptions. ‘Aristotle,’ for instance, can be analyzed into the conjunction of definite descriptions such as “the author of the Nicomachean Ethics,” and “the most famous student of Plato.” Wittgenstein’s objection to this is that it does not capture our actual use of the proper names in ordinary language. More specifically, even if one of the descriptions proves false later, this does not invalidate our use of a word, nor does it make the word meaningless.
Finally, it is worth noting that both the determinacy of sense and the sharp boundaries between sense and nonsense are leitmotifs running through the Tractatus. The requirement that simple signs be possible, for instance, is the requirement that sense be determinate (TLP 3.23). In a similar vein, the aim of the Tractatus is to draw a limit to language (TLP, Preface).
References
Baker, G. P. & Hacker, P. M. S. (2005). Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning: Volume 1 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Part II: Exegesis §§1–184 , Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Frege, G. (BLA). Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Derived Using Concept-Script, translated and edited by P. A. Ebert, M. Rossberg, and C. Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Wittgenstein, L. (TLP). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge, 1961; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , in: Werkausgabe Bd. 1, 23. Aufl. hrsausgegeben von J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2019.
Wittgenstein, L. (PI). Philosophical Investigations , translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Shulte. Revised fourth edition by P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte. Oxford: Blackwell, 2009; Philosophische Untersuchungen, in: Werkausgabe Bd. 1, 23. hrsausgegeben von J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2019.