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I. Scott Soames’s Partially Descriptive Names
Saul Kripke proposed the direct reference theory of names as an alternative to Descriptism. That is, names and descriptions are not the same as semantically.
So Kripke connects names and descriptions with rigid designator and non-rigid designator by him bringing in a possible world. According to Kripke, most[1] proper names are rigid designator or non-descriptive and descriptive non-rigid designator.
Scott Soames, meanwhile, not only argues partially descriptive names as an exception of direct reference theory but also insists it identifies themselves as proper names. Scott Soames would like to reinforce Kripke’s the direct reference theory of names by accepting Millian. According to Soames, Partially descriptive names are proper names but have descriptive information, whose examples are Trenton New Jersey, Princeton University, Professor Saul Kripke, Princess Diana, etc.
Soames subsequently suggests a definition and conditions of partially descriptive names in his book. The definition of partially descriptive names is as follows.
A partially descriptive name n is semantically associated with both a descriptive property PD and a referent o. The referent o is determined in part by having the property PD and in part by the same nondescriptive mechanisms that determine the reference of ordinary nondescriptive names—for instance, by a historical chain of transmission leading back to o. The semantic content of n includes both o and D. The proposition expressed by a sentence n is F is the same as that expressed by the sentence [the x: Dx & x=y] Fx, relative to an assignment of o to 'y'. This proposition is true at a world w iff o has the properties expressed by D and F at w. To believe this proposition is to believe of o that it has both properties.[2]
According to Soames, ‘Professor Saul Kripke’ is the combination of a reference and descriptive information. To be more specific, ‘Professor Saul Kripke’ consists of the reference of name decided by a historical chain of transmission leading back to o and descriptive information, ‘X is a Professor’.
Then what are the conditions that partially descriptive names ‘Professor Saul Kripke’ meet? Soames proposes the following conditions of partially descriptive names.
- If n is a name that designates o, then n never designates any object other than o, with respect to any world.
- If n and m are names, and n = m is true, then Necessarily if n and m exist, then n = m is true.
- If n is a name that designates an object o, then believing the proposition
semantically expressed by n is F involves believing of o that it "is F."
First, ‘Professor Saul Kripke’ indicate Saul Kripke in any possible world. Second, If ‘Prof. Saul Kripke’ and ‘Professor Saul Kripke’ is the same, then it indicates rigid-designator Saul Kripke. Third, Believing Saul Kripke is a Professor satisfies Saul Kripke could be combined with the predicate “is a Professor.”[3]
II. Mckinsey’s contradiction
On the other hand, McKinsey denies partially descriptive names. Therefore never do partially descriptive names exist to Mckinsey. Therefore the complex names called partially descriptive names by Soames are not having descriptive information but bonder on the description. To support his idea, McKinsey gives examples.
(1) Trenton, New Jersey
(2) Professor Saul Kripke
(3) Snoqualmie Falls has permanently dried up.
In the first example, the location Trenton, New Jersey is just a conventional way of saying, which is the description. To Mckinsey, The location Trenton, New Jersey is an abbreviated descriptive expression, ‘Trenton, which is located in New Jersey. Furthermore, a more specific descriptive expression could be added like Trenton, New Jersey USA.
In a second example, Professor Saul Kripke is a bonder on the definite description like ‘John’s mother’. Mckinsey also argues that prefixing titles to proper names are not having descriptive information.
In a third example, If Snoqualmie Falls dried up, it cease to exist. According to Mckinsey, the descriptive word occurring in names such as city, university, and falls should be changed over time. Unlike examples such as a university, a princess, and a waterfall, the property of being a mother like ‘my mother’ cannot change ever to Mckinsey.
To sum up, Mckinsey argues there are no real examples of partially descriptive names suggested by Soames.
III. My Opinion
I would like to criticize Mckinsey’s contradiction. First, Mckinsey’s argument is not clear as Soames’s.[4] Mckinsey’s argument that Professor Saul Kripke is a kind of description is hard to be accepted intuitively. It is hard to accept not having descriptive information but description simultaneously. Second, Mckinsey’s argument is not strong to be a contradiction to Soames. Previously, Soames explicitly mentioned the exception such as stage names. Therefore, Soames’s argument is not strong enough. Mckinsey, Meanwhile, suggests the contradiction like Mackinaw city, which has not much population as a city, which could be a counterexample to Soames. My question is whether this counterargument could be a strong counterargument enough to reverse Soames’s partially descriptive names.
I would like to suggest arguing a counterpart to Mckinsey, ‘Classical Music Name’. For example, Rachmaninoff Piano Concerto No.2 in a c minor Op.18 is different from Piano Concerto No. 2 in a c minor Op.18 composed by Rachmaninoff.[5] Because historical chains of reference transmission for Rachmaninoff Piano Concerto No.2 in a c minor Op.18 are not independent of Piano concerto No.2 in a c minor Op.18 and vice versa. And Ruth Barcan Marcus also considers name as a tag, which distinguishes the reference from the other. Therefore Rachmaninoff Piano Concerto No.2 in a c minor Op.18 is a partially descriptive name.[6]
IV. Reference
Lee Byung-Duk, From reprsentative language to inferential language, SKKUP
Choi Sung-Ho, Is “Admiral Soonsin Yi” a name or description?, Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University, pp. 143-171
Michael McKinsey, 2005, Critical Notice of Scott Soames Beyond Rigidity, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35, pp. 149-168
Michaelson, Eliot, and Marga Reimer, "Reference", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/reference/.
Scott Soames, 2002, Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press
______________, 2005, Beyond Rigidity: Reply to McKinsey, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35:1, pp. 169-178
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[1] The reason why I mention like ‘most of’ is because of ‘Decriptive usage of name’. For example, there is a man who is not that handsome has much confidence, while his friend doesn’t think like that. So his friend might say like “you are not a Alain Delon.”. In this context, name ‘Alain Delon’ is originated from the typical of handsome.( Lee Byung-Duk, 2017, From reprsentative language to inferential language, SKKUP)
[2] Scott Soames, 2002, Beyond Rigidity:The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press
[3] Prof. Choi Sung-Ho criticizes how can these conditions be authorized in Philosophy of Language.
[4] Choi Sung-Ho, Is “Admiral Soonsin Yi” a name or description?, Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University, pp. 150-151
[5] Scott Soames, 2005, Beyond Rigidity: Reply to McKinsey, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35:1, pp. 175
[6] As Prof. Choi pointed out, I don’t think that that conditions is standard. Also, it should be changed thrid condition to match my case.