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Feldman and Conee - Internalism Defended
- Introduction
In their “Internalism Defended,” Feldman and Conee defend internalism. First, they argue that the proper form of internalism is mentalism, which states that the ground of justification is in the believer's mental states. Second, they give a positive defense, that is, they list out a set of examples that support internalism, where each example demonstrates that a difference in mental states implies a difference in justifications. Third, they give a negative response, that is, they explain various objections to internalism and argue that they fail. In this paper, I summarize their argument in such an order.
- Internalism as Mentalism
According to Feldman and Conee, internalism can be characterized in two different ways. First, internalism is characterized in terms of access. In this view, internalism is the view that what grounds belief p’s justification is accessible to believer S. BonJour, Audi, and Plantinga take internalism this way. This way of characterizing internalism is called ‘accessibilism.’ Second, internalism is characterized in terms of mental states: what grounds the justification is in the believer S’s mental states. Pollock and Sosa characterize internalism in this way. This version of internalism is called ‘mentalism.’
Feldman and Conee say that mentalism fits better in the context of internalism/externalism debate, the debate on whether the degree of justification is determined by our mental states (internalism) or external factors like social milieu or environment (externalism). Stated differently, the debate is to figure out that on which justifications supervene, where A supervenes on B iff A cannot without the change in B. It is obvious that mentalism can capture the supervenient aspect; however, it is not so clear whether accessibilism can. For we need to make a further commitment that what is accessible is within our mental states. Mentalism is more modest than accessibilism in the internalism/external debate. So, mentalism will be the kind of internalism that Feldman and Conee will defend throughout the paper. For the rest of this summary, I will use the word “internalism” to refer to mentalism, following Feldman and Conee.
- A Defense of Internalism
Feldman and Conee defend internalism by providing us with five examples that support internalism. For the sake of brevity, let us see two of them.
First, suppose Bob and Ray are in an air-conditioned hotel lobby and read the same newspaper, which says that it will be warm today. Bob then goes outside and feels that the weather is warm. If so, Bob’s belief that today’s weather is warm is more justified than Ray’s, because Bob not only read the newspaper but also felt it. This is supposed to illustrate internalism in that the difference in the degree of justification is determined by the difference in the mental states. Had Bob not felt that it is very warm today, Bob’s belief would not have been more justified than Ray’s. So, the ground of justification is to be found in one’s mental states.
Second, suppose that a bird expert and a novice bird watcher see a bird. The expert can immediately identify the bird they see, e.g. a woodpecker, but the novice has no good reason to believe that it is a woodpecker. Again, what grounds the difference in the degree of justification is in their mental states, e.g. the expert’s knowledge. Because they had different background knowledge and experiences, they have different grounds for justifications.
These examples, as Feldman and Conee see it, give some support for internalism. I say “some support for internalism,” because, as Feldman and Conee admit, listing out the examples doesn’t prove that there cannot be any exception. Further support is needed. Feldman and Conee’s strategy is to respond to objections raised to internalism.
- Objections and Replies
There are two kinds of objections to which Feldman and Conee reply. First kind of objection, objections under the heading A, appeals to the absence of internal justifiers. This kind of objection focuses on how, in some cases, there aren’t internal justifiers for justified beliefs. Second kind of objection, objections under the heading B, appeals to the connection between justifiers and beliefs.
A. Not enough internal justifiers
A1. Impulsional Evidence
The first objection appealing to the absence of internal justifiers is raised by Plantinga. Plantinga objects to the evidentialist version of internalism, that is, the view that the epistemic justification of belief p is determined by believer S’s evidence for the belief, where S’s evidence is found in S’s mental states. But Feldman and Conee think that Plantinga’s objection can be generalized to any version of internalism.
The objection uses a justified simple mathematical belief like <1+2=3>. For evidentialists, there must be a believer’s evidence responsible for the justification. There are three possible candidates for the believer’s evidence: (1) other beliefs, (2) sensory states, and (3) impulsion. Clearly, none of (1) and (2) can count as evidence justifying <1+2=3>. So, Plantinga says, the only alternative is to appeal to (3). <1+2=3> is justified because we have the evidence of “felt attractiveness.” <2+1=5> is not justified, because this proposition doesn’t feel right. This sort of evidence is called “impulsional evidence,” because the justifying evidence is our impulse. But this poses a problem. For if impulses can justify our beliefs, all our beliefs are justified. We believe that p because we have felt attractiveness to our beliefs. We don’t believe what we don’t feel is correct. Then, it follows that all beliefs are justified. This consequence is unacceptable, and, therefore, as the objection goes, the evidentialist version of internalism fails. In short, the argument goes: (1) simple mathematical beliefs are justified through impulsional evidence, and since (2) all beliefs have impulsional evidence, (3) all beliefs are justified, which is unacceptable.
Feldman and Conee object to each step of the argument. The objection to (1) appears in the last part of the objection, so let us follow Feldman and Conee and first see how they object to (2). (2) is not secured because some beliefs are believed unwillingly. For example, we believe that the sun is much larger than the moon, but we believe so unwillingly; the belief is quite unattractive. (3) is not secured because, even though all beliefs have impulsional evidence, many beliefs are not justified because of competing evidence. Flat earth theorists’ beliefs, for example, are not justified because of competing evidence. Lastly, (1) is not secured because there are other mental states that can justify simple mathematical beliefs like memories. One might have memories from youth that justify the beliefs. Therefore, Feldman and Conee conclude, Plantinga’s objection fails.
A2. Stored Beliefs
The second objection appeals to stored beliefs. Namely, there are no current mental states that justify unconscious justified beliefs. Internalists cannot account for unconscious justified beliefs, e.g. personal facts and facts in our areas of expertise.
According to Feldman and Conee, internalists can make two replies. First, they can reply by saying that unconscious beliefs are only dispositionally justified. Just as some propositions are believed not occurrently but dispositionally, beliefs can be justified dispositionally. This means that the absence of mental states responsible for justification is not pressing for internalists; these beliefs don’t require occurrent justifications. Second, they can appeal to non-occurrent mental states as justifiers. If there are justified non-occurrent beliefs, then there can equally be non-occurrent justifiers. But if there are non-occurrent justifiers, unconscious beliefs can be justified, thus addressing the objection appealing to stored beliefs.
A3. Forgotten Evidence
The last objection concerning the absence of justifiers appeals to forgotten evidence, again raised by Goldman. Suppose Sally read in a New York Times that broccolis are healthy. She formed a justified belief p that broccolis are healthy. But further suppose that Sally, while still believing p, forgot what the source of p is. p is justified, but the justifier is not in Sally’s mental state.
Internalists can give two replies, say Feldman and Conee, depending on their commitments. First, internalists can think that all evidence is conscious. If so, they can appeal to Sally’s confidence as evidence for her belief. Sally feels that p is correct with a high degree of confidence, and that is sufficient to say that p is justified. Second, internalists can think that not all evidence is conscious. These internalists are called “unrestricted” internalists. As Feldman and Conee see it, the unrestricted internalists can further reply by saying that Sally can have some evidence to justify her belief, e.g. consistency with her other beliefs about health and food in general, awareness of the accuracy of her stored beliefs, etc. So, the belief p is justified not through the newspaper she read but through others. Either way, the case of forgotten evidence is not pressing for internalists, thus concluding that objections appealing to the absence of justifiers fail. Feldman and Conee then need to reply to objections concerning links and connections of justifiers and conclusions.
B. Links and Connections
B1. The Need for Higher Order Beliefs
Goldman’s objection is as follows. Suppose that believer S has a justified belief that p. Also, suppose p implies q. S, therefore, has a justified belief that q. The problem is that the fact that p implies q is also a justifier, but the justifier is not in S’s mental states. The fact that p implies q is not in one’s internal representation.
Feldman and Conee reply by saying that justifiers need not be internal representations. Recall the case of bird experts. Bird experts formed a belief that a bird is a woodpecker, but, in doing so, they have not had the internal representation of "a bird that looks like x is a woodpecker" (원래는 꺽쇠입니다. 꺽쇠쓰니깐 하이퍼링크로 변환돼서 따옴표로 바꿨네요). Yet their justifications are grounded by their mental states, as we have seen earlier. Furthermore, a logic TA will be more justified in making logical implications than students do. Again, they didn’t have an internal representation of logical implications, but the supervenience relation is clear enough.
But the cases above are insufficient. For they can only account for the cases in which mental states ground non-trivial justifications. Internalists are required to account for the case of trivial justifications. Feldman and Conee’s reply is that internalists have two routes available. First, internalists can reply by saying that trivial justifications don’t require additional evidence. For example, believing that p might include believing that q. Second, they can also say that trivial justifications require additional evidence like direct insight. In both of the cases, Feldman and Conee can appeal to the supervenience relation between justification and mental states.
B2. Justification of Introspective Beliefs
The last objection is raised by Sosa. The objection is that experiences don’t ‘fit’ the introspective beliefs. If I see a triangle, I am justified in believing that I saw a triangle. But if I see a 23-sided figure, I am not justified in believing so. The degree of justification differs, but my mental states need not be different.
This objection, as I take it, could be pressing for accessibilism. For all that is accessible to the believer for grounding the justifications are the experiences of seeing the figures. But this is not the case for mentalism. For the source of the degree of justification can still be grounded by an ability to recognize 23-angled figures. It is plausible that one person with the ability will recognize the figure better than the one without the ability. Our experiences, in some cases, might not justify introspective beliefs; however, the objection is compatible with the supervenience claim.
- Conclusion
Feldman and Conee characterized internalism in terms of supervenience, because it more accurately depicts the internalist position in the debate. But the supervenience claim turns out to allow internalists to sidestep the issues. Internalism, unlike how various scholars suggest, remains unproblematic.