지난 번 올렸던 글을 계속하는 대신, Dieter Henrich의 논문 Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht를 요약하는 것이 더 좋을 것 같다는 생각이 들어 착수했습니다. 이 부분은 논문의 도입 부분입니다. 독일어를 읽고 영어로 요약하는 짓을 통해 성공적으로 둔한 두뇌를 괴롭힐 수 있었던 시간이었습니다. 피히테로 박사과정을 하고 있는 동료에게 물어보니 이 논문이 일반적인 피히테 연구사에 있어서도 고전적인 지위를 갖고 있다고 합니다. Tugendhat의 Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung을 사실 주텍스트로 읽고 있는데요. 강의집 형식인 이 책의 1강에서 Tugendhat는 Dieter Henrich가 이끌었던 Heidelberger Schule의 과업이 기존의 자의식을 논하려는 모든 시도들이 역설(Paradoxien)에 빠진다는 것을 보여주는 것이었고, Henrich의 이 논문은 특히 피히테의 시도가 역설에 빠지는 것을 보여준 논문이라고 평가합니다. 그럼에도 뒤에 따르는 이 요약은 논문의 첫 부분의 요약이라 피히테를 다루지도 않았으니 핵심없는 요약이 되어버렸습니다. 하지만 시간이 허락하는 한 뒤따르는 다른 요약들도 한 번 써보겠습니다. 그것도 영어로 할 지는 잘 모르겠습니다. 요즘 @yhk9297 선생님이 올려주는 깔끔한 영작법을 참고하며 연습해보고 싶은 마음이 크긴 한데, 학기 중에는 너무나 바빠 욕심을 따라가지 못하네요.
Dieter Henrich argued that different philosophers throughout history have seen self-consciousness as a central theme, but they tend to focus on its function as a foundation for other knowledge rather than examining it in and of itself; they all share the idea that self-consciousness involves the subject turning back on itself, making it impossible to fully grasp the self as an object.
He maintained that the theory of self-consciousness has gone through different periods, starting with Descartes making the self the basis of philosophy. Leibniz saw self-consciousness as the model for metaphysical concepts of power and substance, while Locke argued the self was just an act of identification. Rousseau believed self-consciousness was necessary for judgment, and Kant made it the basis of his philosophy.
All these theories, according to him, focus on the theme of self-consciousness and consider it as a principle that can be used to justify other knowledge. They all share the same idea of the structure of the self as a subject that is in a continuous relationship with itself through reflection. This relationship is achieved through the subject turning its own activity of thinking back on itself, thus achieving the unique case of identity of activity and performed action. This theory can be summarized as the theory of the nature of the self as reflection.
The idea presented may seem logical, but it is actually circular because it presupposes what it aims to explain. The problem is that the concept of "Ich" (self) can only be used where a subject has grasped itself. This could be seen as that which distinguishes self-awareness from other forms of knowledge. He pointed out, however, that the theory of reflection aims to explain the origin of self-awareness, but it cannot do so without presupposing it. The subject of reflection must already be both knowing and known, which creates a circularity that cannot be escaped.
Attempts to escape this circular problem by assuming the self-subject is actually not the self-consciousness fails, as self-consciousness is the result of reflection and requires the identity of its relata. If the self-subject is not the self, the equation of self-consciousness (I = I) cannot be achieved. Furthermore, the theory of reflection, which suggests that the self gains knowledge of itself through reflection, fails to explain how the self can know that its object is identical to itself. This knowledge of identity cannot come from a third party, but must come from the self's own immediate experience. Therefore, the theory of reflection relies on circular reasoning and does not provide a complete solution to the problem it aims to address.