

<심리철학 추가자료>

Subject Matter	Main Readings	Further / Background Readings
<p>Overview of the Philosophy of Mind</p>	<p>Kind, Amy (2020). "Mind and Mentality." In <i>Philosophy of Mind: The Basics</i>, ch. 1, pp. 1–21. London: Routledge.</p>	<p>—</p>
<p>Identity Theory & Behaviourism</p>	<p>Place, U. T. (1956). "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" <i>British Journal of Psychology</i>, 47, 44–50.</p> <p>Ryle, Gilbert (1949/1990). <i>The Concept of Mind</i>. London: Hutchinson; Penguin reprint. Chs. 1–2.</p>	<p>Heil, John (2013). "Behaviourism." In <i>Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction</i> (3rd ed.), ch. 4. Routledge.</p> <p>Smart, J. J. C. (1959). "Sensations and Brain Processes." <i>The Philosophical Review</i>, 68, 141–156.</p> <p>Lewis, David (1966). "An Argument for the Identity Theory." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>, 63, 17–25.</p> <p>Lewis, David (1972). "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications." <i>Australasian Journal of Philosophy</i>, 50, 249–258.</p> <p>Lewis, David (1970). "How to Define Theoretical Terms." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>, 67, 427–446.</p>
<p>Functionalism</p>	<p>Levin, Janet (2016). "Functionalism." <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> (Winter 2016 ed.).</p> <p>Lewis, David (1980). "Mad Pain and Martian Pain." In Block (ed.), <i>Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology</i>, Vol. 1. Harvard University Press.</p>	<p>Putnam, Hilary (1967). "Psychological Predicates." In <i>Art, Mind, and Religion</i>. University of Pittsburgh Press.</p> <p>Putnam, Hilary (1975). "The Nature of Mental States." In <i>Mind, Language and Reality</i>. Cambridge UP.</p> <p>Kind, Amy (2020). <i>Philosophy of Mind: The Basics</i>, ch. 4.</p> <p>Heil, John (2013). <i>Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction</i>,</p>

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		<p>ch. 6. Block, Ned (1978). "Troubles with Functionalism." <i>Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science</i>, Vol. 9. Van Gulick, Robert (2009). "Functionalism." In <i>Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind</i>. OUP.</p>
<p>Eliminative Materialism & Connectionism</p>	<p>Churchland, Paul M. (1981). "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i>, 78, 67–90.</p> <p>Buckner, Cameron & Garson, James (2019). "Connectionism." <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i>.</p>	<p>Antony, Louise (2009). "Thinking." In <i>Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind</i>. Montague, Michelle (2010). "Recent Work on Intentionality." <i>Analysis</i>, 70, 765–782. Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). <i>Saving Belief</i>. Princeton UP.</p> <p>Churchland, Paul M. (1988). <i>Matter and Consciousness</i>. MIT Press. Fodor, Jerry & Pylyshyn, Zenon (1988). "Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture." <i>Cognition</i>, 28, 3–71. Stich, Stephen (1996). <i>Deconstructing the Mind</i>. Oxford UP. Clark, Andy (2014). <i>Mindware</i>, ch. 4. Oxford UP. Churchland, Paul M. (1995). <i>The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul</i>. MIT Press.</p>
<p>Interpretationism</p>	<p>Dennett, Daniel C. (1987). "True Believers." In <i>The Intentional Stance</i>. MIT Press. Davidson, Donald</p>	<p>Yoo, Julie (2009). "Anomalous Monism." In <i>Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind</i>. Davidson, Donald</p>

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	(1970). "Mental Events." In <i>Experience and Theory</i> .	(1993). "Thinking Causes." In <i>Mental Causation</i> . OUP. Kim, Jaegwon (1993). "Can Supervenience Save Anomalous Monism?" In <i>Mental Causation</i> . Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). "Real Patterns." <i>The Journal of Philosophy</i> , 88, 27–51.
Mental Causation	Yablo, Stephen (1992). "Mental Causation." <i>The Philosophical Review</i> , 101, 245–280. Kim, Jaegwon (1998). "The Many Problems of Mental Causation." In <i>Mind in a Physical World</i> . MIT Press.	Bennett, Karen (2007). "Mental Causation." <i>Philosophy Compass</i> , 2, 316–337. Fodor, Jerry (1974). "Special Sciences." <i>Synthese</i> , 28, 97–115. Kim, Jaegwon (2011). <i>Philosophy of Mind</i> , ch. 7. Menzies, Peter (2013). In <i>Mental Causation and Ontology</i> . OUP. Horgan, Terry (1993). "From Supervenience to Superdupervenience." <i>Mind</i> , 102, 555–586. Robb, David & Heil, John (2021). "Mental Causation." <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> .
Consciousness (Conceptual Foundations)	Stoljar, Daniel (forthcoming). <i>What Is Consciousness?</i> , ch. 1. Routledge. Nagel, Thomas (1974). "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" <i>The Philosophical Review</i> , 83, 435–450.	Stoljar, Daniel (2016). "The Semantics of 'What It's Like'." <i>Mind</i> , 125, 1161–1198. Block, Ned (2007). "Concepts of Consciousness." <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i> , 30. Rosenthal, David (1986). "Two Concepts of Consciousness." <i>Philosophical Studies</i> , 49.

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The Science of Consciousness	Stoljar, Daniel (forthcoming). <i>What Is Consciousness?</i> , ch. 3. Aaronson, Scott (2014). Blog posts on IIT. Graziano, Michael (2016). "Can We Make Consciousness an Engineering Problem?" <i>Aeon</i> .	Tononi, Giulio et al. (2016). "Integrated Information Theory." <i>Nature Reviews Neuroscience</i> , 17, 450–461. Baars, Bernard (2017). "Global Workspace Theory." In <i>Blackwell Companion to Consciousness</i> . Webb, Taylor & Graziano, Michael (2015). "Attention Schema Theory." <i>Frontiers in Psychology</i> .
Illusionism & Qualia	Frankish, Keith (2016). "Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness." <i>Journal of Consciousness Studies</i> , 23(11–12), 11–39.	Dennett, Daniel (1988). "Quining Qualia." Balog, Katalin (2016). "Illusionism's Discontent." <i>JCS</i> . Kind, Amy (2012). "Sticking to One's Diet." <i>Consciousness and Cognition</i> , 21. Churchland, Paul (1985). "Reduction, Qualia, and Introspection." <i>Journal of Philosophy</i> , 82.
The Knowledge Argument	Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2009). "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument." <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> . Lewis, David (1999). "What Experience Teaches." In <i>Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology</i> . Cambridge UP.	Jackson, Frank (1982). "Epiphenomenal Qualia." <i>Philosophical Quarterly</i> . Gertler, Brie (2005). "The Knowledge Argument." <i>Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i> . Nemirow, Laurence (2007). "So This Is What It's Like." In <i>Phenomenal Concepts and Knowledge</i> .
The Conceivability Argument	Chalmers, David J. (2003). "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature." In <i>Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind</i> .	Kripke, Saul (1980). <i>Naming and Necessity</i> , Lecture 3. Hill, Christopher (1997). "Imaginability and Conceivability." <i>Philosophical Studies</i> . Balog, Katalin

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		<p>(1999). "Conceivability and the Mind–Body Problem." <i>The Philosophical Review</i>. Bennett, Karen (2021). "Why I Am Not a Dualist." <i>Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind</i>. Goff, Philip et al. (2022). "Panpsychism." <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</i>.</p>