Propositoinal Attitude Reports에 대한 스탠포드 철학 백과 문서를 읽다가 이해가 안 되는 부분이 있어 여쭙습니다.
Consider the following.
(8) Jack and Jill went up the hill and Jack believes that she went up first.
There is a reading of (8) where ‘she’, as it occurs in (8), is anaphoric on ‘Jill’; that is, ‘she’ is anchored to ‘Jill’, in the sense that the reference of the former is inherited from the reference of the later. ‘Jill’, as it occurs in (8), is outside the scope of a propositional attitude verb and hence has its customary reference. So, then, it would seem, ‘she’ must also have the customary reference of ‘Jill’ and hence must refer to an individual and not a sense. This runs contrary to Frege’s reference-shift claim.
(...)
The Fregean should not be terribly perturbed by these observations. (...) In his 1969, Kaplan taught us how we can be Fregeans and allow quantifying into attitude verbs. (...) A sentence like (8) would then be read as something like: “Jack and Jill went up the hill and (there is an individual-concept c that ”designates“ Jill such that) Jack stands in the belief relation to the proposition consisting of c and the semantic value of ‘went up first’.”
위 단락에서 필자는 카플란의 이론이 프레게주의를 견지하면서도 (8)과 같이 anaphorism이 포함된 믿음 문맥을 해명할 수 있다고 설명합니다. 이어지는 내용은 다음과 같습니다.
The simple Fregean solution, however, faces other, more serious, problems. First, the account seems to fail when we try to extend it to other types of attitude reporting sentences than the classical examples we have considered above. One of our most common ways of referring to individuals is to use indexicals and demonstratives, such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘this’, ‘she’, and ‘they’. (...) Consider, for example, the following sentence.
(10) Alice believes that I will solve an important problem in physics.
Suppose that Bob Smith utters (10). Smith’s use of ‘I’ tells us nothing about how Alice represents Smith; in particular, it does not refer to or otherwise involve anything that we would ordinarily call the sense of ‘I’. (...) Call this the problem of indexicals.
제가 이해가 안 되는 것은 왜 (8)과 (10)이 별개의 문제인지입니다. 제가 보기에 (10)은 (8)과 같은 방식으로 설명될 수 있습니다. 왜냐하면 (10)은 (10')과 같이 풀어 쓸 수 있으며,
(10') X is Smith, and Alice believes that X will solve an important problem in physics.
여기서 "Alice believes that X..."의 "X"는 "Smith"에 anaphoric하므로 카플란의 이론으로 설명될 수 있기 때문입니다. 그렇다면 어째서 SEP는 (8)을 문제적이지 않은 것으로 간주하는 한편 (10)은 문제적인 것으로 간주하는 건가요?
